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Abstract: This paper provides quantitative and qualitative assessments of the 
equalization impact on regional fiscal disparities of the current fiscal transfers system in 
China. It also discusses the main problems with the design of transfers and the options for 
their reform. In particular, by using provincial level data for the period 1995-2011 and 
county level data for the period 1995-2005, we document the trends in own revenue 
disparities across and within provinces and analyze how the different types of fiscal 
transfers have affected these two types of disparities. The paper also examines how 
expenditure disparities have translated into disparities in service provision and simulates 
the additional amounts of funding needed from equalization grants to bring the less well-
off provinces to the country average for service provision.  
  
                                                        
1 We would like to thank the editors and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and 
suggestions, which helped improve the paper. We also thank Shaozhe Zhang and Wei Zhou for their 
help with data collection. 
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1. Introduction  
The most recent reform that has been undertaken by China’s central government in the 
area of intergovernmental fiscal relations is the so-called “tax-sharing system” or TSS 
reform in 1994, which largely reshaped the fiscal landscape in China by recentralizing 
revenues while at the same time further decentralizing expenditure responsibilities. A 
natural outcome of this reform in revenue and expenditure assignments---indeed one that 
has been frequently and increasingly criticized---was the creation of large horizontal 
fiscal disparities across subnational governments (Wong 1998, 2000; World Bank 2002; 
Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2008; Zhao 2009; Martinez-Vazquez and Qiao 2011). These 
disparities pose serious threats for the cohesion of the nation. For one thing, increasing 
horizontal disparities in the allocation of fiscal resources is leading to inequitable fiscal 
outcomes at the sub-national level; in particular, there is a lack of access to basic public 
services by many residents in poor and rural local jurisdictions of China (Bahl 1999; 
Uchimura and Jutting 2009; Jin and Sun 2011; Shen et al. 2012). In addition, from an 
efficiency viewpoint, large disparities in the availability of public services lead to 
economically inefficient migration patterns and geographical allocation of economic 
resources; the increase in fiscal disparities has become an increasingly significant 
obstacle to the country’s economic growth and political stability (Knight and Li 1999; 
Bird and Wong 2005; Wang et al. 2000).  
            As a supplementary policy tool to potentially ameliorate regional fiscal disparities, 
a formal intergovernmental fiscal transfer system was first established in the 1994 reform. 
Despite the fact that the central government has been increasingly stepping up its efforts 
to strengthen the role of the transfer system, most of the current studies reach the same 
conclusion that fiscal disparities have remained high in the post-1994 era---indicating a 
limited equalizing (if not anti-equalizing) effect of the system (Knight and Li 1999; 
Ahmad et al. 2004; Dabla-Norris 2005; Tsui 2005; Heng 2008; Martinez-Vazquez et al. 
2008; Zhao 2009; Huang and Chen 2012; Wang and Herd 2013). In particular, based on 
relevant methods to decompose the sources of fiscal inequality indices, Tsui (2005), 
Heng (2008) and Zhao (2009) find evidence that fiscal transfers from the central 
government do not shrink but indeed widen fiscal disparities at both the county and 
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provincial levels. In contrast, Huang and Chen (2012), Jin et al. (2013), and Wang and 
Herd (2013) detect some equalizing elements of the system, though the overall equalizing 
effect is limited---in large part due to the offsetting effects from different components of 
the transfer system.  
Nevertheless, the design of any system of transfers is a complex matter, and in 
practice very few countries are able to get it right, especially when the decentralized 
system of finance is still fairly new. In this paper we focus exclusively on the analysis of 
the existing transfer system in China and aim to provide both quantitative and qualitative 
assessments on the existing regional fiscal disparities and the overall equalization effect 
of the transfers system. Our paper differs from previous studies in several important ways. 
Specifically, we analyze the following: (a) the own revenue disparities across and within 
provinces; (b) the equalizing/un-equalizing effects of fiscal transfers and its components 
on revenue disparities across and within provinces; (c) how disparities in expenditure 
finally translate into disparities in service provision; (d) how much additional funding 
would be needed from the central government to bring the less well-off provinces to the 
country average; and (e) the possible options for comprehensive reform. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we first review the 
basic setup of the current transfer system. In section 3 we use both provincial level data 
for the period 1995-2011 and county level data for the period 1995-2005 to analyze the 
existing regional disparities in fiscal resources and the equalization effect of the current 
fiscal transfer system. In section 4, we summarize the main structural problems with the 
current transfer system and propose some options for comprehensive reform of China’s 
transfer system. The last section concludes.  
2. A Brief Perspective on Intergovernmental Transfers in China 
In 1994, the Chinese government implemented the TSS reform classifying all taxes into 
three categories: central taxes, shared taxes, and local taxes between the central and local 
government.
2
 Meanwhile, separate central and local tax bureaus were established at the 
                                                        
2 Central taxes include the tariff and tonnage tax, the consumption tax and VAT levied by the customs, the 
consumption tax and income tax from enterprises that are subordinate to the central government, the 
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provincial, city/prefecture, county, and township levels. The central tax bureau was put in 
charge of collecting central taxes and most of the shared taxes, while the local tax 
bureaus were made responsible for the collection of all local taxes.  
In addition to rearranging revenue assignments between the central and local 
governments, the TSS reform introduced for the first time in China rules-based 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer programs with the objective of accommodating gaps in 
fiscal capacity and expenditure needs across local jurisdictions.  
However, after twenty years in operation, the new system of transfers has been only 
partially successful at that objective. The limited equalization impact of the 
intergovernmental transfers has been due in part to its initial design. As an important 
example, which is further discussed below, the TSS reform introduced the “tax rebates” 
as a “hold harmless” compensation for the richer provinces, which ended up being a 
major component of the transfer system with persistent highly un-equalizing results. The 
general-purpose equalization transfers later introduced in 1995 have only played a limited 
role in offsetting existing fiscal disparities. Overall, intergovernmental transfers from the 
center to the provinces are still not well developed. The situation is worse for transfers 
from provincial to local governments where, in all these years, no transparent framework 
has emerged. In what follows we take a closer look at the current transfer system at both 
levels. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
income taxes from rail transportation, state post, state-owned commercial banks, and head office of 
insurance companies. Local taxes include the business tax and urban infrastructure tax (other than from the 
headquarters of banks, and insurance companies, and rail transportation), the income tax from locally 
owned enterprises, the urban land use tax, tax on occupation of arable land, VAT on land, the property tax 
and inheritance tax, the contract tax, the motor-vehicle and ship use tax, the agriculture tax, the banquet tax, 
the livestock slaughter tax, the farmland conversion tax, and the reorientation tax on capital construction. 
Shared taxes include VAT (75% central; 25% local), the personal income tax and enterprise income tax 
(50:50 in 2002; 60:40 from 2003), the urban infrastructure tax (rail transportation, headquarters of banks 
and insurance companies 100% central, others 100% local), the resource tax (offshore 100% central and on 
land, 100% local), and the stamp tax on security transactions (97% central; 3% local).  
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2.1 Central-provincial transfers 
Under the current setting, fiscal transfers from the central government to the provincial 
governments can be broadly categorized into three main types: 
(1) The tax rebate 
The tax rebate, a compromised outcome to smooth the implementation of the TSS 
reform, was introduced to guarantee the vested interests of provincial governments prior 
to the reform. Its essence was to return to the provinces the amounts of VAT, 
consumption taxes and income taxes that otherwise would have gone to these provinces 
under the system existing prior to the reform. More specifically, the tax rebates on VAT 
and consumption taxes considered 1993 as the base year and, beginning in 1994, all 
provinces were guaranteed to receive at a minimum the VAT and consumption tax 
revenues they had retained in 1993.
3
 
In 2002, the corporate income taxes and personal income taxes became shared taxes 
as opposed to local taxes, and so additional rebates on income taxes were introduced to 
protect the vested interests of local governments. In particular, if the amount of income 
tax revenues received by local governments under the new sharing scheme were to be 
less than what they received in 2001, the central government was supposed to provide 
additional income tax rebates to fill the gaps.  
Although quite significant in absolute terms in the initial years, because the tax 
rebates were determined on the basis of the nominal collections of the base year, the 
relative importance of the income tax rebates, as was the case for the VAT and 
consumption tax rebates, has been rapidly decreasing over time.  
(2) The system of equalization transfers  
 Currently, the equalization system in China involves a number of formula and non-
formula-based transfers, all of which have in common the general objective of reducing 
                                                        
3 See Zhang and Martinez-Vazquez (2003) for a more detailed description of the formula used in the 
calculation of the rebate amount. 
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horizontal fiscal disparities. And while over time the relative importance of transfers with 
equalization objectives has grown steadily, that of tax rebates has continued to decline. 
Transfers with an equalization objective include the following:  
(a) The “transitory period transfers” (renamed “general-purpose grants” after 
2001). This transfer represents the first formula-based transfer program introduced in 
China, with an explicit equalization objective to reduce fiscal disparities across 
provinces. The amount of the transfer is determined by a formula based on the 
computation of a standard revenue and standard expenditure by the central authority. 
Standard revenues are measured by using estimates of the tax bases and the standard tax 
rate. Standard expenditures are calculated using a myriad of expenditure needs categories 
including spending on administration services, public safety, education, urban 
maintenance, social assistance, and heating.
4
 Note that even though the origin of this 
transfer can be traced back to 1995, just after the TSS reform, the general-purpose grant 
was only first explicitly budgeted for in 2001. And it was only in 2012 that the Ministry 
of Finance set up the current formal standardized approach to calculate the equalization 
transfer. These changes have much improved the stability and transparency of this 
category of transfers.  
(b) The “pre-tax sharing system grants”. These grants are actually the contracted 
fixed grants existing under the “contracted fiscal system” before the TSS reform in 1994. 
These transfers have ensured that the “poor provinces” have total nominal revenues that 
are not less than what they were in 1993. At the present time there are only about 16 
provinces receiving these grants. Most of these provinces are in the central and western 
regions of the country. 
(c) The transfer to minority regions. This transfer was launched in 2000 with 
RMB 1 billion to further support the development of minority regions. The pool of funds 
is composed of two parts: the first part is financed directly from the central budget with a 
yearly growth rate equaling the growth rate of centrally shared VAT revenues;
5
 the 
second part is 80% of the total amount of the yearly increase in collections for the central 
government share of the VAT collected in minority regions.  
                                                        
4
 The calculation method can be found in "The methods of the central to local equalization transfer in 
2012", see http://yss.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/zhengceguizhang/201207/t20120725_669218.html.  
5 Note that the base pool of these funds is RMB 1 billion in year 2000.  
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(d) Transfers for increasing the wage standard of civil servants. These transfers 
were designed to support provinces in the central and west regions of the country for the 
implementation of policies mandated by the central government for increasing the wage 
standard of civil servants. The main justification was that without this fiscal assistance 
from the central government, many provinces in these regions would have faced serious 
fiscal difficulties complying with the wage mandate.  
(e) Transfer for the rural “Tax-for-Fee” reform 6  and the elimination of the 
agriculture tax. The purpose of this transfer was to partially compensate local 
governments for the revenue losses caused by the implementation of the rural “Tax-for-
Fee” reform in the early 2000s and the complete abolition of the agriculture tax in 2006. 
(f)  Other general-purpose transfers with an equalization objective. These include, 
among others, transfers to cities suffering from natural resource exhaustion, transfers for 
the replacement of the local market place management fee and the industry and 
commercial entity fee, transfers for supporting the Oil Tax and Fee Reform, and  transfers 
for regions with important ecological functions. 
(3) Earmarked specific transfers 
As of 2013 there were 220 specific-purpose grants. The plans are that one third of these 
programs will be cut in the 2014 budget. Earmarked specific transfers typically 
involve the central government response to high-priority emergencies or are generally 
associated with particular programmatic objectives; some examples include fiscal 
stimulus packages, bail-outs of local government social protection programs, or the 
“compulsory education transfer” introduced in support of the rural compulsory education 
program.  
                                                        
6
 See Lin and Liu (2007) for a detailed description of the reform, and Wang and Zhao (2012), Alm and Liu 
(2013) for an analysis on its potential impacts. 
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2.2 Transfers below the provincial level 
The 1994 TSS reform is generally perceived as an incomplete reform because it formally 
regulated only the intergovernmental fiscal relations between the central and provincial 
governments, leaving ample discretion for provincial governments to set up their own 
fiscal relations with their local (sub-provincial) governments. For this reason, fiscal 
arrangement schemes at the sub-provincial level vary from province to province (Shen et 
al. 2012). In general, however, these sub-provincial arrangements follow the basic setup 
of the center-provincial system and fiscal transfers there can also be loosely categorized 
into three groups: tax rebates, equalization transfers, and ad hoc transfers. But generally 
speaking the sub-provincial transfer systems are less well developed and their main focus 
is still the pre-TSS reform practice of filling the gaps between current revenues and 
expenditures.
7
  
3. Equalization Impact of the Current Transfer System 
3.1 Horizontal revenue disparities across and within provinces 
China’s intergovernmental finance system has been characterized by persistent horizontal 
fiscal disparities across provinces and within provinces, especially when the focus is on 
those tax revenues fully assigned to the sub-national governments. Here we review the 
trends in these fiscal disparities across and within provinces.
8
 
Horizontal disparities in own revenue across provinces: Revenue assignments generate 
pronounced fiscal disparities across provinces, especially for the very distinct eastern 
region—relatively rich, and the central and western regions—relatively poorer. Over time 
these disparities have not become less pronounced. In fact, after the 1994 TSS reform, 
horizontal regional disparities in sub-national own revenues deteriorated (Table 1). A  
                                                        
7
 For more detailed discussions of the sub-provincial fiscal system in China, see Wong (1994) and MOF  
(2006). 
8
 Where there are differences in the level of economic development, there are differences in fiscal capacity 
and these differences are naturally enhanced with higher levels of tax autonomy. Most countries deals with 
this issue by strengthening the equalization grant system.  
 
 
 Falling Short: Intergovernmental Transfers in China 9 
 
 
Table 1. Real Per Capita Disparities in Own Revenue across Provinces: 1986-2011 
Year Mean C.V. Min Max 
1986 136.6  1.51  29.4  1063.3  
1987 133.2  1.34  30.2  913.4  
1988 116.4  1.18  37.6  720.0  
1989 111.9  1.07  37.3  634.4  
1990 110.7  1.04  38.6  604.8  
1991 116.1  0.92  42.8  541.1  
1992 112.9  0.90  44.7  518.1  
1993 129.5  0.84  51.1  561.3  
1994 74.2  0.90  27.4  326.1  
1995 80.8  0.86  26.9  329.6  
1996 93.7  0.88  31.6  384.5  
1997 101.1  0.93  34.0  431.8  
1998 118.9  0.95  39.2  492.1  
1999 134.5  0.99  44.3  555.2  
2000 149.5  1.04  48.2  725.2  
2001 184.3  1.17  56.1  1060.9  
2002 202.6  1.21  62.2  1197.7  
2003 232.2  1.25  70.1  1427.6  
2004 265.6  1.24  80.1  1575.0  
2005 334.1  1.28  101.5  2109.2  
2006 397.3  1.25  117.2  2532.7  
2007 484.3  1.25  146.6  3071.7  
2008 552.2  1.23  164.1  3531.8  
2009 630.4  1.24  192.4  4124.0  
2010 733.8  1.16  232.2  4611.7  
2011 895.5  1.11  291.3  5473.1  
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks and Authors' Calculation 
 
significant contributing factor has been the different rates of economic growth in the 
different regions. Over time the coefficient of variation for per capita own revenues 
increased reaching a peak in 2005 of 1.28 and slightly declining in more recent years. 
These horizontal disparities are also reflected in the ratio of the maximum to minimum 
own revenues per capita across provinces. This ratio stood at 11-fold in 1993 just before 
the TSS reform and reached a peak in 2005 of 20-fold; in recent years the ratio has 
decreased only slightly, still standing at 18-fold in 2011.  
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Own revenue disparities within the provinces: Two types of factors influence fiscal 
disparities within the provinces. First, an important feature of China’s intergovernmental 
finance system is that provinces have almost complete discretion to design the revenue 
assignments they implement for their sub-provincial governments. And in fact revenue 
assignments within each province can be quite different. Second, there are often  
significant differences in the levels of economic development and therefore tax bases 
across jurisdictions within the provinces. Having a strongly hierarchically vertical 
government structure potentially compromises the effectiveness of national equalization 
policies in China. Final equalization outcomes clearly also depend on the equalization 
policies implemented by the provincial governments. 
Table 2 shows the disparities in own revenues per capita across counties within 
each province from 1995 to 2011. The figures clearly indicate significant levels of 
disparity within provinces, which vary over time and with trends that differ significantly 
across provinces. While within-province disparities have declined in the eastern region, 
which, again, comprises the richest provinces in China, the trends in other regions have 
been oscillating or have increased quite significantly as in the cases of the northwest and 
southwest regions. On average, the coefficient of variation for per capita own revenues 
within provinces only changed slightly over the observed period; it increased from 1.1 in 
1995 to a value around 1.3 in 2005, and then declined to a value around 1.0 by 2011. 
Even so, as shown in Figure 1, own revenue disparities within provinces have become 
less pronounced across different provinces over the period 1995-2011; the provinces with 
the highest initial levels of disparities in own revenue registered the largest drops, while 
the provinces with low initial levels of disparities in own revenue generally experienced 
an increase in within-province disparities. This point is consistent with what was found in 
Wang and Herd (2013).  
It thus appears that if the central government cares about reducing horizontal 
fiscal disparities, then central government policies need to take into account the existing 
horizontal fiscal disparities within the provinces and to consider the best way to do that 
given China’s strong hierarchical vertical structure of government. 
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Table 2.  Per Capita Own Revenue Disparities within Provinces: 1995-2011 
 Mean C.V. Min Max 
 1995 2005 2011 1995 2005 2011 1995 2005 2011 1995 2005 2011 
Beijing 367 3030 8586 0.6 0.5 0.6 18 1010 2889 741 6092 20516 
Tianjin 793 1368 6410 2.8 0.6 0.7 125 526 1834 9954 2906 14893 
Hebei 132 599 1012 1.8 3.2 0.9 33 37 154 2521 20445 6393 
Shanxi 132 413 1716 0.6 0.7 0.8 24 56 209 470 1562 5649 
Mongolia 150 1104 4107 1.1 1.1 1.6 37 93 167 1537 5312 40509 
Liaoning 266 720 3191 2.6 1.7 0.5 46 76 692 6870 11696 7472 
Jilin 97 272 1519 0.7 0.6 0.5 29 83 336 348 1036 3500 
Heilongjiang 155 299 1113 1.3 2.0 1.3 49 41 170 1784 4957 10691 
Shanghai 907 6596 8302 0.7 0.4 0.8 396 2749 3443 3215 11245 30694 
Jiangsu 156 1707 5441 0.7 1.3 0.9 37 128 1451 456 15980 27655 
Zhejiang 273 2149 3636 2.3 1.5 0.6 46 320 918 4355 26499 10909 
Anhui 108 268 1267 0.4 0.8 0.8 48 41 164 335 1377 4879 
Fujian 210 863 1788 0.5 1.7 0.7 88 144 607 710 9499 7548 
Jiangxi 137 345 1546 0.9 0.4 0.6 40 104 326 1193 784 5886 
Shandong 175 858 1965 2.2 1.8 0.8 36 109 410 3822 17022 7491 
Henan 88 383 916 0.7 1.1 1 27 54 191 308 3576 4596 
Hubei 94 303 952 0.5 1.1 0.7 31 53 148 273 2326 3614 
Hunan 131 375 777 0.6 1.4 0.9 34 64 277 538 4110 5218 
Guangdong 168 867 1144 1 2.6 0.9 32 58 168 878 21394 5577 
Guangxi 114 335 775 0.5 1.9 0.9 24 65 182 349 6239 4208 
Hainan 188 246 1567 0.6 0.7 0.7 69 24 610 588 765 4411 
Chongqing 106 437 5219 0.9 0.9 0.4 41 83 2761 504 1654 10399 
Sichuan 106 271 1047 0.7 1.2 0.9 5 40 141 486 1834 6395 
Guizhou 76 285 842 0.7 1.1 0.7 22 69 199 375 2018 2865 
Yunnan 156 340 1051 0.9 0.9 0.9 20 55 198 838 2117 8076 
Shaanxi 86 410 1431 0.7 2.2 1.8 13 28 121 334 6117 14813 
Gansu 102 218 951 1.1 1.5 2.2 8 19 98 582 2431 16330 
Qinghai 124 326 1597 0.9 1.4 2.7 29 22 98 517 2121 25941 
Ningxia 58 359 1899 0.8 0.8 1 6 39 138 176 790 6086 
Xinjiang 160 536 2573 2.1 1.4 1.2 2 39 229 3029 6088 16840 
Mean 194 876 2478 1.1 1.3 1 47 208 644 1603 6666 11335 
Source: Ministry of Finance, China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy, and Authors’ Calculation 
Own revenue disparities within vs. across provinces: In order to document the relative 
importance of own revenue disparities within provinces and across provinces in 
contributing to the overall revenue disparities in the nation, we calculate the Theil index 
based on county data that provides a way to decompose the overall disparities into 
disparities between groups and disparities within groups. As shown in Figure 2, revenue 
disparities are starker within provinces than across provinces, suggesting that revenue  
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Figure 1. The Initial Level and Changes of Within Province Own Revenue Disparity 
Note: changes in within-province own revenue disparity are calculated as the difference of coefficient of 
variation of per capita county revenue within province for the years 2011 and 1995. 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Authors’ Calculation 
 
disparities within provinces are the main contributor to the overall revenue disparities in 
the nation. This is related to the very different economic experience of counties within a 
province. However, over the years, own revenue disparities across provinces experienced 
a large increase from a value around 0.13 in 1995 to a value around 0.36 in 2008, while 
own revenue disparities within provinces experienced a moderate decrease in this same 
period. In summary, own revenue disparities are larger within provinces than across 
provinces, but this difference has been diminishing over the years. The relative large 
value of own revenue disparities within provinces has also dominated the trends of 
overall own revenue disparities in the country.  
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Figure 2. The Decomposition of Own Revenue Disparities, 1995-2011 
Source: Ministry of Finance, China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy, and Authors’ Calculation 
3.2 Relative equalizing effects of transfers  
The transfer system reduces disparities across provinces but not enough: Here we 
perform a simple exercise to analyze how the disparities in the prime initial disparities in 
“own revenues” per capita evolve as we progressively and cumulatively add the other 
financing sources in the system: first the tax rebates, second the ad hoc transfers, and 
third the equalization grants. We also present side by side the distribution of expenditures 
per capita. If the overall impact of transfers is equalizing, we should end with lower 
disparities in the distributions of expenditures per capita than in the distribution for own 
revenues, but the question remains how much smaller the disparities in expenditures per 
capita should be. The results of the exercise are presented in Figure 3. Three things are 
especially noticeable: (1) provincial disparities in own revenues increased after the 1994 
TSS reform, something already noted; (2) the overall effects of transfers is equalizing 
since provincial disparities in expenditures per capita are significantly lower than the  
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Figure 3. Impact of Fiscal Transfers on Provincial Disparities in Revenues and 
Expenditures  
Note: Figures are calculated at real per capita term. Own revenue is added by tax rebate, ad hoc transfer, 
and equalization transfer continuously. After the equalization transferred is added, it is equivalent to adding 
own revenues to total transfers. Data for the decomposition of transfers at the provincial level are only 
available up to 2004.  
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks and Ministry of Finance 
 
disparities in own revenues per capita, results that confirm the recent similar findings in 
Huang and Chen (2012), Jin et al. (2013), and Wang and Herd (2013). However, the final 
distribution across provinces in expenditures per capita still shows considerable 
disparities by international standards; (3) provincial disparities in both revenues and 
expenditures per capita appear to have declined in the most recent years---a result that is 
partially due to the increase of the share of the equalization transfers and the 
corresponding decrease in the share of tax rebates in the overall transfer pool. 
Equalization effectiveness of transfers differs significantly across the type of transfers: 
As shown in Figure 3, the equalization effects of fiscal transfers vary across different 
components of the transfer system. In general, as is to be expected, the tax rebates do not 
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perform any equalization role but in fact lead to increased disparities across provinces in 
the early years. As we already pointed out, the tax rebate was designed as a compromised 
outcome to smooth the acceptance of the TSS reform by the richer provinces in 1994. On 
the other hand, both the ad hoc transfers and the equalization transfers have contributed 
to lower levels of regional disparities in available per capita resources.
9
 In addition, 
Figure 3 also shows that the equalization effect of those two types of transfers has 
increased over the years, in large part due to the increased pool of funds dedicated by the 
central government to these categories of transfers. Recall also that another significant 
factor for the higher equalizing trend is the fact that the actual volume of the tax rebate 
was fixed in nominal terms in 1994 and that therefore it has been decreasing in relative 
importance over the years.  
Practically all of the previous results have been at the central-provincial level and 
this evidence should be interpreted as preliminary from simple descriptive analysis. In 
order to analyze the equalizing and/or un-equalizing effects of the different components 
of the transfer system more rigorously, we conduct empirical tests to examine the basic 
relationship between different components of the transfers and the economic 
development level of the jurisdiction (proxied by per capita GDP) at both the central-
provincial level and the provincial-county level. Given data limitations at the county 
level, we are only able to decompose total transfers at this level into two categories, tax 
rebates and all other transfers, which include the equalization transfers and ad hoc 
transfers. We run a set of panel regressions with per capita transfers as the dependent 
variable and per capita GDP as the main explanatory variable. In addition, we introduce 
several other control variables that may affect the transfers received by the jurisdiction. 
These include total population, the share of population residing in rural areas, the share of 
public employees in the total population, and the lagged per capita fiscal deficit (defined 
as the difference between per capita fiscal expenditures and per capita fiscal revenues). In 
the estimations, we also include the province fixed effects and year fixed effects in order 
                                                        
9
 While it is generally agreed in the literature that equalization transfers contribute to a lower level of 
revenue disparities, the equalizing/un-equalizing effect of the ad hoc transfers is found to be mixed in the 
previous studies (e.g. Heng 2008; Huang and Chen 2012). 
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to control for the unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity and time-varying 
characteristics.  
An important concern in estimating the model is that of the potential endogeneity 
of the economic development variable. This issue may arise due to the fact that 
increasing the transfers received by local governments is indicative of more fiscal 
resources available and at the discretion of local governments. Therefore, it is quite 
possible that local governments may have used the transfers they received to promote 
local economic development. To circumvent the endogeneity issue, we use an 
instrumental variable approach. The instruments we use for the economic development 
variable are the one-year and two-year lag in per capita GDP. This is justified in the way 
that, by its nature, the lags in the economic development variable are correlated with the 
variable at present, while the transfers received by a locality in the later years should 
virtually have no significant impact on the economic development level in the past. 
Finally, we also correct for the potential heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by 
reporting the Newey-West standard errors in the estimations.  
The regression results are presented in Table 3. As expected, the coefficient for 
per capita GDP is positive and statistically significant in the regressions for tax rebates 
(columns (1) and (4)). Thus, it confirms the un-equalizing nature of tax rebates at both 
the central-provincial level and provincial-county level---better-off provinces/counties 
receive more per capita tax rebates. However, the coefficient for per capita GDP is 
negative and significant in the regression for all other transfers (columns (2), (3), and 
(5)), which again is consistent with what we concluded above that both equalization 
transfers and ad hoc transfers are somewhat equalizing. Nevertheless, the marginal un- 
equalizing effect of the tax rebates is relatively larger and it overwhelms the marginal 
equalizing effect of other transfers. 
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Table 3. Determinants of different components of transfers 
 Central-Provincial Transfers  Provincial-County Transfers 
 Tax rebate Equalization Ad hoc  Tax rebate Equalization 
and others  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
       
GDP per capita 0.036*** -0.023*** -0.013***  -0.004*** 0.011*** 
 (7.020) (-6.357) (-2.818)  (-2.725) (6.951) 
Population 0.002 -0.009 -0.023  -0.398*** -0.188*** 
 (0.642) (-1.069) (-1.181)  (-3.583) (-3.523) 
Share of rural 0.772*** -0.264 -0.998**  -0.068 -0.254** 
  population (2.871) (-0.879) (-2.282)  (-0.537) (-2.575) 
Share of public 222.477*** 18.691 58.653  60.108*** 0.795 
  employee/pop (3.847) (0.219) (0.460)  (8.344) (0.231) 
Lag fiscal deficit -0.006 0.356*** 0.443***  0.233*** 0.027 
  per capita (-0.865) (12.193) (4.921)  (2.717) (0.526) 
       
Province fixed         
effects 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 269 269 269  11,610 11,506 
Note: The sample period for estimations at the central-provincial level and provincial-county level are 
1995-2004 and 1995-2005 respectively; t-statistics are in parentheses; GDP per capita is treated as an 
endogenous variable and it is instrumented by one-year and two-years lags of GDP per capita; Newey-West 
standard error is calculated in the estimations; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
As far as the control variables are concerned, total population is negatively 
associated with all types of transfers received, but it is only statistically significant in the 
estimations at the provincial-county level. Fiscal deficit in the previous year generally 
leads to a higher level of transfers received, particularly for ad hoc transfers and 
equalization transfers. The share of rural population and the share of public employees in 
the total population appear to have inconsistent signs across the different estimated 
equations.  
The impacts of fiscal transfers on revenue disparities within provinces vs. across 
provinces: Given the results above, of greater revenue disparities within provinces than 
across provinces, we are interested to see how the current transfer system may affect the 
within and across-province disparities differently. To explore this further, we follow the 
previous methods to add own revenues by tax rebates and all other transfers continuously 
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at the county level, and then calculate the corresponding Theil indexes to decompose the 
overall disparities into disparities within provinces and between provinces. 
 
 
Figure 4. Impact of Fiscal Transfers on the Decomposition of Provincial Disparities 
in Revenues and Expenditures 
Note: Figures are calculated at per capita term. Own revenue is added by tax rebate and all other transfers 
continuously.  
Source: Ministry of Finance and Authors’ Calculation 
 
The results are presented in Figure 4. Three noticeable trends are apparent. First, 
both own revenue disparities within provinces and across provinces are reduced by the 
transfer system, and the overall equalizing effect is increasing, especially in recent years. 
This result contrasts with the general observation in the literature that the transfer system 
had not reduced fiscal disparities at the sub-provincial level (Tsui, 2005; Zhang and 
Zheng, 2010), but it is in turn consistent with the most recent findings by Wang and Herd 
(2013). Second, considering the magnitudes of the effects, the reduction of revenue 
disparities within provinces is relatively larger than the reduction in revenue disparities 
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across provinces. As shown in Figure 4, even the tax rebates play a minor role in 
reducing revenue disparities within provinces; however, they play virtually no role in 
reducing the revenue disparities across provinces.
10
 Third, revenue disparities within 
provinces remain high. Despite the equalizing effects of the transfer system, revenue 
disparities within provinces are still more than twice as large as revenue disparities across 
provinces.  
3.3 Linking expenditure per capita to differences in access to public services  
The most important determinant of access and quality of basic public services is the level 
of public expenditures. So it is logical that we ask what the relationship is between 
disparities in expenditures per capita and disparities in service provision.  To answer this 
question we look at the evolution over time of disparities in service provision and the 
correlation between expenditure per capita and access to service provision. Our focus 
here will be on education services. 
In fact there is a significant correlation between real per capita provincial 
expenditure on education and the intermediate output measure of the ratio of teachers per 
1,000 students in primary schools (Figure 5(a)). In addition the dispersion for both 
variables, as shown by the coefficients of variation in Figure 5(b), did rise steadily over 
the period up to 2005 followed by a fast decline in the subsequent years. It could be that 
this change is related to the “province-managing-county” reform introduced by the 
central government around that time,
11
 which meant that some provincial governments 
started to directly manage their county governments thus bypassing the prefecture level. 
The reversal in trend indicates some convergence across provinces on the budgetary 
priority given to this basic service. Nevertheless, with coefficient of variation of 0.8 in 
2011, the disparities in education outputs still remain too high.  
  
                                                        
10 Indeed, tax rebates enlarge the revenue disparities across provinces in the early years of the reform. 
11
 Using a panel data set of 108 counties in Henan province for the years 1999-2008, Wang et al. (2012) 
find that the “province-managing-county” reform reduces local governments’ spending on education. 
However, if the “province-managing-county” reform was predominantly implemented in provinces with 
originally high education expenditures, then the trend in declining of disparities in education expenditure 
across provinces can still be observed. 
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Figure 5. Mean and coefficient variation of per capita education expenditure and 
number of teachers per 1,000 primary students, 1986-2011. 
   Source: China Statistical Yearbooks and Authors’ Calculation. 
 
4. Options for the Reform of the Current Transfer System 
China’s system of intergovernmental transfers has been evolving over the past two 
decades, but it has retained its fundamental nature of origin-based shared taxes 
supplemented by grants and subsidies for a myriad of purposes and with considerable 
redundancy.  The end result has been a limited degree of equalization among provincial 
and sub-provincial governments and a complex system of transfers by any standards.
12
 
Even though in some functional areas disparities have decreased, overall disparities 
across provinces in available per capita fiscal resources and actual expenditures per capita 
remain very high by international as well as China’s own historical standards. In this 
                                                        
12
 See Zhang and Martinez-Vazquez (2003).   
 Falling Short: Intergovernmental Transfers in China 21 
 
 
subsection, we review the main issues of the current system and propose several options 
for the possible reforms of the system.  
4.1 Additional funding needed from the central government 
In terms of the total pool of funds we have seen above that there has been a steady 
increase in the dedicated funds, but these have not been enough to reduce the still very 
high expenditure per capita disparities across provinces. Thus, the first relevant question 
is how much additional funding would be needed from the central government---for 
example in some form of equalization grant---to bring the less well-off provinces to the 
country average.  
There are actually many possible ways to answer this question. A simple but still 
quite informative approach is first to select the national average fiscal capacity as the 
normative measure of fiscal need for the provincial governments. With this we then can 
calculate the increase in the overall pool of funds for transfers required to bring provinces 
with fiscal capacity below the national average to the national average.
13
 The calculation 
of the national average of fiscal capacity can be based on a measure using only “own 
revenues” or alternatively using total revenues including transfers from the central 
government. Our calculations indicate that these amounts would have been 979,273 
million and 933,276 million respectively, based on average values for 2009-2011.
14
 This 
would represent 28.8% and 27.4%, respectively of the total central government transfers 
(average values for 2009-2011). Although by no means insignificant these are feasible 
levels of additional funding if done over a period of several years.  
A significant portion of the required funds could come from a parallel structural 
reform granting more revenue autonomy to the provinces; this type of reform would 
mostly benefit the richer provinces, but the overall outcome would be a reduction of 
intergovernmental transfers especially to the richer provinces, which would benefit the 
                                                        
13
  We must emphasize that our simple approach leaves out considerations involving economies of scale 
and scope or demographic and geographic characteristics of the provinces. The national standard could 
potentially be adjusted by an index incorporating differences in relative expenditure needs and costs of 
services.   
14 Our calculation procedure is not reported in this paper, but it is available upon request.  
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most.
15
 On the down side, higher equalization transfers would no doubt increase the level 
of transfer dependence of poorer provinces. However, the entire policy package—
simultaneously increasing revenue autonomy and redistributing the recipients of 
transfers---would make the intergovernmental finance system more equitable by ensuring 
that minimum service standards are provided to all citizens regardless in what part of the 
country they live. The policy package would also have efficiency benefits by limiting 
population migration driven simply by differences in the standards of public service 
provision. There are also positive political economy aspects in the package, since both 
relatively richer and relatively poorer provinces may perceive themselves as winners.   
         However, one caution we need to highlight here is that if the additional funding is 
distributed through unconditional equalization grants, there is no guarantee that the 
additional funds would be spent on essential social services. The strong current incentives 
for subnational officials to spend on infrastructure and economic development projects 
would remain in place. Because of this, a well-balanced increase in both unconditional 
equalization transfers and conditional grants, especially sectoral block conditional grants, 
in some particular priority areas of expenditure/services would appears to be a more 
balanced desirable way to allocate the additional funding.  
4.2 Bringing more certainty to the available pool of funds for equalization  
At present the pool of funds available for equalization is decided in the annual budget on 
an ad hoc basis. This brings budget uncertainty to the recipient subnational governments 
and signals lack of commitment by the central government to the equalization objective, 
which may be sacrificed under budgetary pressures. In the international practice this issue 
of budgetary uncertainty and lack of commitment is addressed by introducing a (funding) 
formula for determining the pool of available equalization funds; one common such rule 
is a percent of total tax revenues lagged one or two budget periods. Actually in recent 
                                                        
15
 As a matter of fact, our calculation of the transfer dependence (i.e. the ratio of fiscal transfers to total 
expenditure) over the past 15 years indicates that the general tendency has been for richer provinces in the 
eastern region to become less reliant on transfers, at the same time that relatively poorer provinces in the 
central and especially the western regions have become increasingly more reliant on transfers. Given that 
there have been practically no changes in revenue assignments in China over the past two decades, it is 
likely that these different trends can at least be partially explained by the differing sizes of the regional 
economies and their respective rates of growth. 
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times the central government has moved toward the formalization of the available pool of 
equalization funds by earmarking its share of income tax revenues for equalization. But, 
of course, these are only a part of the overall funds currently used for equalization.  
4.2 Addressing the fragmentation of conditional grants  
Over the last several decades China has followed the path of many other countries around 
the world using and abusing the system of conditional grants to address new policy 
initiatives, emergencies or old problems that needed fixing. The result has been a 
complex and highly fragmented conditional grant system, which imposes high 
administrative burdens on subnational governments. The fact that most of these 
conditional grants have matching fund provisions had added to heavy budgetary 
pressures on subnational governments. To cope with these pressures subnational 
governments have used unorthodox public accounting, such as “double-matching” or 
using the same funds to comply with the matching provision in different grants.  
In dealing with the issue of fragmentation the recent international experience 
shows that many countries have consolidated their myriads of conditional grants into a 
much smaller number of block grants supporting national sectoral strategies. The block 
grants are also conditional—that is, the resources need to be used in a particular sector 
but they avoid micro-management by allowing subnational governments more discretion 
for the very specific uses. However, these grants tend to provide better balance between 
ensuring the use of resources in the pursuit of sectoral objectives and granting sub-
national governments more budget discretion. Similar reforms could have a high payoff 
for China.  
4.3 Eliminating the other counter-equalizing elements in the transfer system  
Existing horizontal disparities are to a large extent due to several policy choices made 
within the framework of the 1994 TSS reform, which were fundamentally counter 
equalizing. At the top of those choices was the “tax rebate” which purportedly was 
introduced to buy the support of the richer provinces for the 1994 reform. Also of 
significant importance was the adoption of revenue sharing on a derivation basis or where 
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the money is collected. The implication of the derivation basis is that richer provinces get 
to keep more funds because they have tax bases.
16
  
The un-equalizing role of the tax rebate has been reduced over time because by 
design the rebate was fixed in nominal terms. Similarly, the un-equalizing effects of the 
derivation principle in tax sharing have been reduced because the central government has 
increased its sharing rates for certain taxes in recent years.  Beyond increasing the pool of 
funds available, further equalization could be achieved by changing the allocation of the 
shared VAT revenues to a formula based on population. Of course, quite likely the 
wealthier provinces would oppose this.  
4.4 The need to further formalize the sub-provincial transfer system  
Along the lines of a strong federalist system, something that formally China is not, 
provincial governments have virtually complete discretion to arrange their fiscal relations 
with prefectures and cities, while the latter can do the same vis-a-vis their counties, and 
so on. After the 1994 TSS reform subnational governments supposedly restructured their 
intergovernmental fiscal relations with lower-level governments. However, the general 
perception has continued to be that provincial and prefecture governments do not allocate 
funds commensurate to the expenditure needs of lower level governments and that often 
they retain funds originating at the center which were intended to reach county and 
township level governments.  
The question is whether or not subnational governments currently have too much 
discretion on how to organize their intergovernmental fiscal relations with their lower-
level governments. High levels of discretion offer advantages especially in a country as 
large and diverse as China. On the other hand, the central government also needs venues 
to ensure the attainment of its own policy objectives, such as equalization. Thus there is a 
need to find ways to balance flexibility at the subnational level with the ability of the 
central government to implement its own policies and achieve its own policy objectives. 
                                                        
16 Merely as an indication, in 2000 just before income tax shares were amended, the nine provinces in the 
coastal area (Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Shangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejing, Fujian, Shanghai, and Canton) 
collected about 70% of the total income taxes. 
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The “province-managing-county” reform has been a relatively recent move in that 
direction; but even though this reform has helped to streamline vertical fiscal 
relationships, it clearly falls short of reaching the right balance between subnational 
flexibility and ensuring national objectives. 
Reaching a balance will likely require the redesign of the sub-provincial transfer 
system. These reforms actually would closely resemble those needed at the central level: 
setting aside sufficient funds for equalization grants, using explicit funding rules to 
enhance predictability, and using improved allocation formulas capturing the disparities 
in fiscal capacity and expenditure needs of lower-level jurisdictions.  All this may require 
more central government rules and intervention in the subnational finances. The goal of 
granting all citizens access to basic public services quite likely warrants it.   
5. Concluding remarks  
One of the most significant policy objectives of the Chinese government at the 
present time is to move toward a more equal society where all citizens have access to 
basic public services regardless of where they live. Despite the efforts until now, 
geographical disparities in expenditures per capita still remain too high, implying that 
access to basic public services is still too unequal across the country. Going forward and 
getting closer to the goal of a more equal and just distribution of services will require 
further increasing the overall pool of funds dedicated to equalization and making this 
increased funding more stable and predictable by adopting an explicit funding rule for the 
available pool of funds. The current allocation formula also could be further improved by 
refining the measurements of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity.  
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